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STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR CAUSING DEATH.
(Completed.)

It has been held in Wisconsin, Woodward v. Chicago & N.
W. Ry. Co. (1868), 23 Wis. 400, that an action, brought under
the statute giving damages for the benefit of relatives, abates
on the death of the beneficiary; and in Missouri, Gibbs v. City
of Hannibal(1884), 82 Mo. 143, that the right of action will
not survive to the administrator of a beneficiary; on the theory
that the action, given by the act, is itself a continuance or survival of the right of action vested in the decedent. In Connecticut, however, a statute (distinct from the one heretofore
quoted), making a railroad company liable when the life of a
passenger is lost by negligence, it was held that the right of
action would survive the death of the beneficiary named in the
act: P'aldo v. Goodsell (1866), 33 Conn. 432 ; and, in an early
case in the New York Supreme Court, Yertore v. Wiswall
(1858), 16 How. Pr. 8, which is followed in a recent case inthe
same Court, Hegerich v. Keddie (1884), 32 Hun. 141, DANIELS,
J., dissenting, it is held that the right of action survives against
the personal representatives of the wrong doer; the action
authorized being, in the view of the Court, "a new action, not
another action continued," and the subject of the action being
regarded as "property, the value of a life."
In the Illinois case of Holton v. Daly (1883), io6 Ill. 131, it
will be remembered that the Court wished an administrator
continuing an action begun by his intestate for personal injuVOL. XXXVIL-37
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ties, to be regarded as continuing it under the act giving damages for death; it is therefore interesting to note that in the
opinion in Yertore v. Wiswall, it is said that it would not be
proper, if an action is begun during the life of a person injured, to ask for a continuance of it after his death under the
statute: per HOGEBOOM, J., Id. 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 13.
To the-same effect, it would seem, is the Indiana case of
Indianapolis& St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Stout (1876), 53 Ind. I43.
There a statute provided that".A cause of action, arising out of an injury to the person, dies with the person
of either party, except in cases in which an action is given for an injury causing
the death of any person, and actions for seduction and false imprisonment."

An action having been brought by an injured person during
his lifetime, pending which he died from the injuries, it was
held that such action was abated by the death, and that it was
consequently no bar to an action brought by the administrator
under the statute giving damages for the benefit of the deceased's family.
In several instances, questions have arisen as to the application of the statutes of limitations to these actions, and have
involved a discussion as to the nature of the right of action
conferred. In Connecticut, under the Act of that State last
referred to, Andrews v. Hartford& N. H R. R. Co. (1867), 34
Conn. 57, it is held that the right of action accrues only upon
death, and that therefore the statute of limitations will not
begin to run until the appointment of an administrator.
In Iowa, Sherman v. Western Stage Co. (1868), 24 Iowa 516,
in case of a death by drowning, it was held that the death
should be considered as instantaneous, although the deceased
struggled in the water for ten minutes before he drowned; and
that, as the statute of limitations therefore did not begin to
run in the lifetime of deceased, it was suspended until the appointment of an administrator. COLE, J., dissented in this case,
holding that the cause of action rests upon the occurrence of
the injury, and did so in the case at bar, upon the deceased's
falling into the water, that the statutes do not create a new
cause of action, but simply remove the common law bar to a
recovery, when the wrongful act produces death; he quotes
approvingly the language of COMSTOCK, J., in Dibble v. N. Y &
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E. R. R. Co. (1857), 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 183, and distinguishes the
English statute from our American statutes, on the ground
that, under the former, the parties receive damages severally
proportioned to their losses. Subsequently to the last named
decision, a provision seems to have been incorporated in the
Iowa Code, to the effect that"Such action shall be deemed a continuing one, and to have accrued to such
representative, or successor, at the same time as it did to the deceased, if he had
survived."

Under this enactment, it is held that the statute of limitations runs from the time of the original injury: Ewellv. Chicago & N. TV. Ry. Co. (1886), U. S. C. Ct., S. Dist. Iowa, 29
Fed. Repr. 57. It had previously been held in Iowa, Sherman
v. l14stern Stage Co. (1867), 22 Iowa 556, that the action was
one for injury to the person, and therefore subject to the two
years statute of limitations, applicable to-such actions.
In Tennessee, a case, Fowikes v. Nashville & DecaturR. R.
Co. (1872), 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 829, involving the application of
the statute of limitations, came before the Court, and was held
under advisement until 1876, the Court being equally divided
upon the case until the death of the Chief Justice occurred
and left an odd number of judges. Itwill be remembered that
the statute of Tennessee provides that the right of action,
which the person killed would have had, shall not abate, or be
extinguished, by his death, but shall pass to his personal representative for the benefit of his widow and next of kin. The
statute is, in fact, a hybrid in form, being the result of an attempt to combine the two ordinary forms of enactment; that
is, one making the right of action belonging to the injured
person to survive his death, and the other creating a right of
action in favor of third persons for the injury to them by the
death. In dealing with the question of damages under it, and
the question of its application to cases of instantaneous death,
the earlier decisions treated the statute as merely a survival
act, limiting the damages to such as the injured person himself could have recovered in his lifetime, and denying the application of the act altogether in cases of instant death ; but
a subsequent decision gave it a wider scope, acknowledged its
applicability to cases of instant death, and permitted damages
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to be assessed, both on account of decedent's sufferings, etc.,
in his lifetime, and the loss suffered by his relatives in consequence of his death. With this double theory of the purpose
and operation of the statute, it naturally became a very difficult and embarrassing matter to say when the statute of limitations, in an action under it, would begin to run. In fact, the
members of the Court were not able to agree after retaining
the case for four years. The majority held that the statute of
limitations began to run at the moment of the injury, and
therefore was not suspended during the period between the
death and the qualification of the administrator, as it would be
if the cause of action did not accrue until after the death. The
death, in the case before the Court, did not occur until a few
days after the injury, and it, perhaps, was not necessary to decide anything with regard to the case of instant death, but the
majority opinion nevertheless covers that question, holding
that the statute, in such case, begins to run immediately, and
is not suspended, upon the theory that, in every case, a moment elapses between the infliction of the injury and the death,
there being strictly no such thing as instant death. The statute, the prevailing opinion says, merely repeals the rule of the
common law, that actions for personal injuries die with the
person, in cases where the person dies of the injury. A dissenting minority of two (there, being five members of the
Court), held that the statute did not begin to run until the
death, and consequently not until the appointment of an administrator; the position being taken distinctly and emphatically, especially in the opinion of TURNEY, J., that the statute

created a new cause of action which only accrued upon the
death of the person injured.
With this review of the authorities, including all of importance which have come to our notice, bearing upon the question of construction which we proposed at the outset, let us
return to a consideration of that question upon its merits. We
have no hesitation in declaring a preference for the view which
regards the right of action given by Lord Campbell's Act and
those of our American statutes which do not differ widely
from it in form, as a new right of action, and not a revival or
continuation of a common law right possessed by the deceased.
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When we consider (I) that the purpose of the action is to
compensate certain persons for the indirect injury to them, involved in causihg the death of another; (2) that the right of
action thus given, is not conditional upon a right of action
having vested in the deceased, but arises, as well in cases of
instantaneous death, as others, the remedy being in fact particularly called for in cases of sudden death; and (3) that the
damages given in the action, entirely exclude such as the deceased himself could have recovered, we find it impossible to
reach any other conclusion.
It is frequently said that the scope of the original right of
action, which the deceased would have had, is merely enlarged
so as to embrace the injury resulting from the death (See
Cooley on Torts * 264), but this attempted explanation of the
different rule of damages applied in the action under the statute, will not serve its purpose, since not only are new damages
included in the new action, but the old damages are entirely
excluded; the remedy is not enlarged to embrace the death,
but is, under the statute, confined to the death. It is sometimes said that it is impossible to draw a line, severing with
accuracy the damages to the person injured, from those to his
relatives. See, for example, Holton v. Daly(I883), io6 Ill. 131,
page 14o, of .opinion; but it is a sufficient answer to this objection, that both the language of the statute, and all the decisions, construing it, require such a line to be drawn.
Then again it is said that, although the measure of damages
is different from what it wpuld be in an action by the injured
person in his lifetime, the cause of action is in both cases the
same, that is, the wrongful act, neglect or default. The simple
answer to this statement is, that the two actions are brought
for different consequences of the same act, and are certainly
as distinct from each other as is the action brought by a husband, or father, for an injury to his wife, or child, from the
personal action of the wife, or child, for the same injury.
The view that the right of action given by the statute is
merely a continuance of the common law right of action was
first broached, as we have seen, when the question of permitting two recoveries arose. In our view, the courts, in their
anxiety to prevent what was deemed a most undesirable result,
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overshot the mark and advanced a theory of the statute which
they could not successfully defend, and which was perhaps not
necessary to accomplish the desired end. We are disposed to
agree with the recent New York case of Littlewood v. Mayor
of New York (1882), 89 N. Y. 24, in thinking that enough is
to be found in the language of the statute, to disclose an intention not to allow a suit to be maintained under the statute, when
the injured person has recovered compensation in his lifetime,
but not upon the theory that the statute provides for a continuation, in the representatives, of the cause of action which the
deceased had. The original act, the wording of which is
closely followed by the New York and other acts, although
making the damages recoverable such as result to the relatives named,from the death, provides that"The person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable
to an action for damages, notwithstandingthe death," etc.

This seems very much like a contradidion in terms, as if
the statute spoke of one being liable for a death, and at the
same time, notwithstandingthe death. The use of the latter
expression, taken by itself, favors the theory which we are opposing, but, for the reasons before given, we must regard it as
controlled and outweighed for general purposes by the general
scope, and the language of other parts of the Itct. As the
whole clause quoted, however, indicates an intention on the
part of the legislature to impose liability only upon one who
would otherwise have escaped liability by the death of the injured person, effect may be given to it so far, and it may be
construed to exclude liability under the statute, when the deceased has himself recovered damages in his lifetime. The
phraseology of the statute shows confusion of thought, and this
it is which is responsible for the controversies which have
arisen.
The Pennsylvania statute, before referred to, commends itself
to us as a model of clearness and brevity. It provides that-"Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and

no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the
widow of such deceased, or, if there be no widow, the personal representative, may
maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned :" Act
15 April, 1851, I8, P. L. 674.
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This language is plain and consistent. Damages are to be
recovered "for the death," not " notwithstanding the death,"
and yet only on condition that no suit was brought by the
party injured during his or her life. Such stubborn controversies could hardly arise under this act, as we have found
arising under the English act and most of its American descendants. In one Pennsylvania case, it was claimed that the
act was "not intended to create any new cause of action unknown to the common law, but only to prevent the abatement
of personal actions according to the common law maxim, actio
personalis ioritur cunm persona;" but the claim was overruled
by the Court: Fizkv. Garma (I86I),4o Pa. 95. This American statute says directly what the English statute says inferentially, and, in both cases, the right of action given is not a
continuation of that which the deceased had, but an independent remedy which, where no law provides expressly for the
survival of the former, is, in effect, a substitute therefor.
As to the right to maintain two actions after the death of the
injured person (supposing him not to have recovered damages
in his lifetime), where there is, in addition to the special act, a
general provision of law making rights of action, for injury to
the person, survive, it seems that such right should be ordinarily recognized, in the absence of an express provision to the
contrary. The opposite and inconsistent courses adopted by
different courts, in the attempt to escape from this result, seem
to convict them all of being without warrant. If this is the
correct view, it will sometimes happen that two actions will be
maintainable after death, one representing the injured person's
cause of action, the other the family's cause of action, when, at
the same time, a recovery upon the former, before death, would
have precluded any further recovery whatever; and it may be
urged as an objection to the view, therefore, that it involves an
inconsistency. There is seeming force in this objection, but
the charge of inconsistency should be laid at the door of the
legislature which enacts the statutes. From the fact that the
special statute only provides for an action after death, when
none has been brought in the lifetime, it can not properly be
inferred that there is to be only a single action after death,
when there has been none during the lifetime; because, if for

